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The basis for Iran’s belligerence

Opinion/IdeasThe basis for Iran's belligerence

The basis for Iran’s belligerence

By Shlomo Ben-Ami Israel’s approach to the conflict with its neighbors has too frequently been characterized by mental fixation: It has generally veered away from diplomatic paths in favor of fighting them and "explaining" to the world how dangerous these enemies are to it, as well as to Israel. Thus Israel was the last to understand that the PLO, with all its flaws, was the only partner around; as long as the United States did not recognize the organization, Israel remained fixated. Today, it is the Hamas’s turn. Here, too, the attempt to get rid of the organization by pounding it militarily – after, due to our fixation, we helped to create it – will not succeed.

Once, Israel was also fixated on the assumption that the Baath regime in Damascus must and can be toppled. This regime is very much alive and kicking today, 40 years after its establishment.

The "Iranian syndrome" is Israel’s present fixation. For years, Israel has been telling the world about the Iranian danger, demanding that the international community ostracize the ayatollahs’ regime and enlisting it to fight Iran’s nuclear program. But, like previous preventive strategies, this one is not likely to succeed either.

Once it became clear that Saddam Hussein’s Iraq was on its way to becoming a nuclear power, and once Pakistan became such a power, the countdown toward Iran’s becoming a nuclear power began. The limitations of Israel’s deterrence, as exposed in the war in Lebanon, did not help to stop the Iranian race toward nuclear power. There is also no chance that the international community would follow the U.S. into an all-out confrontation with Tehran, or even impose sanctions in it. America lost its ability to form international coalitions in Iraq, and it lost its legitimacy for independent action as well.

The question today is not when Iran will have nuclear power, but how to integrate it into a policy of regional stability before it obtains such power. Iran is not driven by an obsession to destroy Israel, but by its determination to preserve its regime and establish itself as a strategic regional power, vis-a-vis both Israel and the Sunni Arab states. The Sunnis are Iran’s natural foe, not Israel. The answer to the Iranian threat is a policy of detente, which would change the Iranian elite’s pattern of conduct.

But detente, like the strategy of conflict with Iran, is not a matter that Israel can deal with on its own. It is first and foremost an American issue. Unfortunately, George Bush’s America is not interested in conflict resolution; instead, like Israel, it is fighting rearguard battles against evil states and organizations. What happens when these collapse is on display in Iraq: Never has the Middle East been more dangerous and volatile than it has been since Saddam Hussein was toppled. The U.S., in destroying Iraq as a counterweight to Iran, is directly responsible for Iran’s current strategic edge, as well as for its audacity.

The U.S. also holds the key to returning Iran to a path of negotiations and international cooperation. But to do this, it must make a decision that would be difficult both for itself and for Israel: It must conduct an open dialogue that would recognize Iran’s regional importance. This would moderate its demeanor and ultimately lead to a gradual change in its regime.

The saber rattling by Israel and Iran is convenient for both. For Israel, presenting itself as the democratic West’s front line in the war against fundamentalist terror and the ayatollahs’ regime is helpful in mobilizing the world against Iran’s nuclear aspirations. But the international community’s capitulation in the face of Iran’s determination has proved just how dubious this approach is.

As for Iran, its venomous attacks on Israel and the Jews are its way of mobilizing the Islamic world to support the Iranian regime and its regional aspirations. To the "Arab world," Iran is an enemy. But in the Islamic world that Mahmoud Ahmedinejad is fostering, Iran has a leadership position. Iran is not so much an enemy of Israel as an enemy of any Israeli-Arab reconciliation process, which would ultimately enable the Sunni Arab world to direct all its forces against the real enemy: Shi’ite Iran and its pretensions to hegemony.

An Israeli-Arab peace and the neutralization of the Iranian threat should therefore be mutually reinforcing. A detente policy with Iran would have far-reaching implications for the chances for peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors. Equally, however, an international peace conference, which would renew the momentum for ending the Israeli-Arab conflict, would remove the basis for Iran’s belligerency. Neither sanctions nor even military action can disperse the doomsday cloud hanging over the region. Only divesting Iran of nuclear arms as part of a comprehensive Israeli-Arab settlement could do so.

The source: Haaretz (Tel Aviv, Israel).

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