Ten years of cold peace
by Hasan Abu Nimah Someone not steeped in the region’s affairs might have to search deep in the annals of history to realize that Jordan and Israel signed a peace treaty ten years ago. There are no visible manifestations of normal relations to indicate the existence of such an historic achievement to ordinary observers. Actually, the opposite is true; after a full decade of "peace," Israeli cars entering Jordan still have to exchange their Israeli license plates for temporary Jordanian ones to disguise their origin. And, except for the surge of visitors that followed the Wadi Araba treaty signing on October 26, 1994, the greatly reduced volume of Israeli visitors tends to remain highly discreet if not invisible. The reasons are obvious, and the present situation confirms a long-existing fear: peace cannot be realized by leaders signing documents in spectacular ceremonies. Peace must be the outcome of the voluntary will of the people; it must be just, genuine, convincing, reciprocal and comprehensive. These indispensable characteristics have been absent from all of the peace treaties or accords concluded so far between Israel and its Arab neighbors, without exception. As a war-weary president, Anwar Sadat was compelled to sign a peace treaty with Israel on very harsh terms, mainly because Egypt was exhausted by a state of continuous confrontation. And without any prospect of ending the historic conflict otherwise, so were the PLO and Jordan when they signed their respective accords with Israel. In fact, when the Arabs chose "peace as their strategic choice" at the Arab League summit in Cairo in 1995, they were, also, simply running out of alternatives. Israel, rather than seizing the historic opportunity to engage in serious negotiations with its Arab neighbors on the basis of fair and reasonable terms for a lasting settlement, chose to exploit their weakness and impose–with full American backing–further injustice and humiliation, albeit in the name of making "peace". Sadat had struggled desperately in his negotiations with the Israelis to avoid a separate peace, in favor of establishing a peace formula on the basis of the relevant Security Council resolutions for application on the Syrian and the Jordanian-Palestinian fronts as well, but he failed. Israel never wanted to deal with the Arabs collectively. Israel insisted on taking its Arab neighbors one by one, believing that by isolating each state, it could secure the best terms, and then use any precedents set when negotiating with the next. This method was successfully used in the 1949 armistice talks, and Israel has used it ever since. Israel’s eventual acceptance of the 1991 Madrid conference was predicated on the condition that Madrid would be no more than a brief ceremonial entry to direct, separate negotiations with each Arab state. One of Israel’s main strategic goals was to sideline the UN, which it also achieved in the 1990s with the support of the Clinton administration. The US later created the "Quartet" in order to disguise the absence of the UN, and give false international legitimacy to a process controlled by the Americans with Israel’s advice, if not outright instructions. The sad result is that Israel has not only blocked all progress toward a comprehensive and accepted peace, of which the Egyptian, the Palestinian and the Jordanian agreements were meant to be only initial steps; it has actually been undoing the benefits of these initial steps. It is a great mistake to measure the success of the Jordanian-Israeli peace on the basis of economic or material benefits that have anyway been far fewer than even the most pessimistic expectations. Nor would it be fair to assume that direct economic prosperity and improvement of the quality of life could not have significantly buttressed support for the treaty. Yet, we should clearly keep in mind that no amount of economic progress would be sufficient alone to build peace without justice. The greatest truth that Israel has obstinately refused to understand is that it cannot have normal relations and warm peace with Jordanians, or with any other Arab state, while its occupation forces commit regular atrocities against the Palestinians, and occupy other Arab lands. In past decades, Israelis used to justify their reluctance to leave the occupied Arab territories with the contention that they wanted real peace. They repeatedly claimed that while the Arabs would be getting huge areas of land, Israel would only be getting a piece of paper. The truth is that the Arabs have proven their readiness for real, genuine, and comprehensive peace which would have gained for all the people in the region, mainly the Israelis, the security they have never had. If, as a result of Israel’s deliberate and intransigent policies, its peace with Jordan and the other peace treaties and agreements are viewed as worthless pieces of paper, then Israel should know where to lay the blame.- Published 28/10/2004 (c) bitterlemons-international.org The source: Hasan Abu Nimah is a former ambassador of Jordan to the United Nations. He was a member of the Jordanian (and the Jordanian-Palestinian) delegation to the post Madrid peace talks in Washington, DC. Currently he is a writer and a political analyst on Middle Eastern issues. Bitterlemons International http://www.bitterlemons-international.org is an internet forum for an array of world perspectives on the Middle East and its specific concerns. It aspires to engender greater understanding about the Middle East region and open a new common space for world thinkers and political leaders to present their viewpoints and initiatives on the region. Its audience is the interested public and policymakers. Bitterlemons-international.org is edited by Ghassan Khatib and Yossi Alpher. Each week, bitterlemons-international editors decide on a topic and invite four writers or interviewees to discuss that subject on our pages.